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1.  Introduction 
Game-theoretic  models  of  bargaining  can  be  thought  of  as  falling  into  two 
broad  classes:  a.uiomatic  and  strategic.  I  In  all  of  these  models  the  preferences 
of  the  bargainers  are  represented  by  their  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility 
functions. 
A  series  of  recent  experiments  has  shown  that  these  models  lack  descrip- 
tive  power  in  a  number  of  important  respects.  In  particular,  very  clear  ‘focal 
point’  effects  have  been  observed,  of  a  kind  that  will  be  described  in 
somewhat  more  detail  below,  that  cannot  be  accounted  for  within  the 
framework  of  these  classical  game-theoretic  models. 
At  the  same  time,  the  success  of  these  classical  models  in  the  theoretical 
economics  literature  rests  on  the  intuitively  appealing  qualitative  predictions 
that  they  make  in  a  variety  of  circumstances.  Some  of  these  qualitative 
predictions  may  prove  to  have  descriptive  power  even  though  other  aspects 
of  the  same  model  do  not,  Since  these  models  are  stated  in  terms  of  the  von 
Neumann-Morgenstern  utilities  of  the  bargainers,  their  qualitative  predic- 
tions  are  inevitably  involved  with  the  bargainers’  risk  postures. 
*This  work  has  been  supported  by  grant  NSF.SES.84-09172  from  the  National  Science 
Foundation.  A  full  report  of  this  work  can  be  found  in  ‘Risk  Aversion  in  Bargaining:  An 
Experimental  Study’,  Murnighan,  Roth  and  Schoumaker  (1986). 
‘The  most  influential  single  model  has  undoubtedly  been  the  axiomatic  model  of  Nash  (1950). 
For  a  survey  of  the  literature  on  axiomatic  models,  see  Roth  (1979).  A  particularly  interesting 
strategic  model  has  recently  been  proposed  by  Rubinstein  (1982).  An  overview  of  a  variety  of 
strategic  models  can  be  found  in  Roth  (1985a). 
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Roth  (1979)  Kihlstrom,  Roth  and  Schmeidler  (1981)  Roth  and  Rothblum 
(1982),  and  Roth  (1985b)  systematically  studied  the  models’  predictions  for 
the  risk  posture  of  bargainers.  Rather  surprisingly,  a  very  broad  class  of 
different  models,  including  all  the  standard  axiomatic  models2  and  the 
strategic  model  of  Rubinstein3  (1982),  yield  a  common  prediction:  risk 
aversion  is  disadvantageous  in  bargaining,  except  when  the  bargaining 
concerns  potential  agreements  that  have  a  positive  probability  of  yielding  an 
outcome  that  is  worse  than  disagreement.  (This  will  be  discussed  in  more 
detail  below  in  the  context  of  a  specific  experimental  design.) 
The  experiment  described  below  was  designed  to  distinguish  between  the 
prediction  of  the  axiomatic  and  strategic  models  discussed  above,  and  three 
alternative  hypotheses:  (1)  bargaining  ability  is  a  personal  attribute  uncorre- 
lated  with  risk  aversion;  (2)  bargaining  ability  is  a  personal  attribute  that  is 
correlated  with  but  distinct  from  risk  aversion  (e.g.,  ‘aggressiveness’),  thus 
influencing  the  outcome  of  bargaining  independently  of  the  location  of  the 
disagreement  point;  and  (3)  the  outcome  of  bargaining  is  not  influenced  by 
the  personal  attributes  of  bargainers,  but  rather  by  the  structure  of  the 
information  shared  by  the  bargainers.  The  last  hypothesis  is  motivated  by  the 
focal  point  effect  observed  in  previous  experiments. 
2.  Binary  and  ternary  lottery  games 
To  experimentally  test  theories  that  depend  on  the  von  Neumann- 
Morgenstern  utilities  of  the  bargainers,  the  experiment  must  permit  these 
utilities  to  be  determined.  A  class  of  games  that  permits  this  was  discussed  in 
Roth  (1979)  and  first  used  in  an  experimental  setting  in  Roth  and  Malouf 
(1979).  In  these  binary  lottery  games,  each  agent  i  can  eventually  win  only 
one  of  two  monetary  prizes,  a,  or  bi  (with  ai>  bi).  The  players  bargain  over 
the  distribution  of  ‘lottery  tickets’  that  determine  the  probability  of  receiving 
the  larger  prize:  e.g.,  an  agent  i  who  receives  40%  of  the  lottery  tickets  has  a 
40%  chance  of  receiving  the  amount  ai  and  a  60%  chance  of  receiving  the 
amount  b,.  Players  who  do  not  reach  agreement  in  the  allotted  time  each 
receive  bi.  Since  the  information  about  preferences  conveyed  by  an  expected 
utility  function  is  meaningfully  represented  only  up  to  the  arbitrary  choice  of 
origin  and  scale,  there  is  no  loss  of  generality  in  normalizing  each  agent’s 
utility  so  that  ~,(a,)=  1 and  ui(bi)=O.  The  utility  of  agent  i  for  any  agreement 
is  then  precisely  equal  to  his  probability  of  receiving  the  amount  ai,  i.e.,  equal 
to  the  percentage  of  lottery  tickets  he  has  received. 
‘Including  those  of  Nash  (1950),  Kalai  and  Smorodinsky  (1975).  and  Perles  and  Maschler 
(  1980). 
‘See  Roth  (198%).  For  a  different  interpretation  see  Binmore,  Rubinstein  and  Wolhinky 
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Note  that  the  set  of  feasible  utility  payoffs  to  the  players  of  a  binary 
lottery  game  is  thus  insensitive  to  the  magnitudes  of  the  amounts  a,  and  bi 
for  each  agent  i.  One  of  the  effects  clearly  observed  in  earlier  experiments4 
but  not  predicted  by  the  classical  game-theoretic  models  is  that  these 
magnitudes  nevertheless  influence  the  outcome  of  bargaining.  When  bar- 
gainers  knew  the  amounts  of  each  other’s  prizes,  agreements  tended  to 
cluster  around  two  ‘focal  points’:  the  ‘equal-probability’  agreement,  that  gives 
each  bargainer  50%  of  the  lottery  tickets,  and  the  ‘equal  expected  value’ 
agreement,  that  gives  each  bargainer  the  same  expected  value.’  When 
bargainers  did  not  know  one  another’s  prizes,  or  when  the  bargainers  had 
the  same  prizes  (so  that  the  equal  probability  and  equal  expected  value  focal 
points  coincided)  agreements  were  observed  to  cluster  around  the  equal- 
probability  agreement,  often  with  extremely  low  variance.6 
Note  also  that  the  reason  that  the  set  of  utility  payoffs  in  a  binary  lottery 
game  is  insensitive  to  the  size  of  the  monetary  prizes  is  that,  precisely 
because  each  agent  faces  lotteries  between  only  two  final  payments,  his  utility 
is  not  influenced  by  his  risk  posture.  Risk  aversion  is  a  phenomenon  that 
depends  on  the  ability  to  make  tradeoffs  between  at  least  three  outcomes. 
For  our  present  purpose,  we  will  therefore  consider  bargaining  between 
two  players  in  a  ternary  lottery  game,  in  which  each  player  i  has  three 
monetary  prizes,  ai,  bi,  and  ci[ai>  bi  and  ai>  ci].  The  players  bargain  over 
probabilities  p,  and  pZ  (with  p2 =  1 -pr)  such  that  player  i  receives  ai  with 
probability  pi,  and  receives  bi  with  probability  1 -pi.  If  the  players  fail  to 
reach  agreement  in  the  allotted  time,  then  players  1 and  2  receive  c,  and  c2, 
respectively.  Letting  the  utility  functions  of  the  players  be  normalized  so  that 
ui(ai) =  1 and  ui(bi) =O,  the  utility  of  agent  i  for  any  agreement  is  once  again 
equal  to  his  probability  pi  of  receiving  a,.  However  each  player’s  utility  ui(ci) 
for  his  disagreement  payoff  ci  is  determined  by  his  risk  posture. 
To  compare  the  risk  aversion  of  two  individuals  consider  three  monetary 
amounts  a,  b,  and  c,  with  a>  b>c.  Then  a  measure  of  an  individual’s  risk 
aversion  on  this  domain  of  three  possible  payoffs  is  the  range  of  lotteries 
between  a  and  c  that  he  is  willing  to  accept  in  preference  to  having  the 
amount  b  for  certain,  i.e.,  the  minimum  probability  of  getting  a  (rather  than 
c)  that  makes  him  like  the  lottery  at  least  as  much  as  the  certain  amount  b. 
The  individual  i  who  is  willing  to  accept  the  smaller  range  of  lotteries  -  i.e., 
who  has  the  higher  minimum  probability  pi  -  is  said  to  be  the  more  risk 
averse  of  the  two  individuals  on  this  domain. 
4Perhaps  most  clearly  in  Roth  and  Murnighan  (1982). 
s1t  is  this  latter  agreement,  of  course,  that  is  sensitive  to  the  magnitudes  of  each  player’s 
monetary  prizes.  The  distribution  of  agreements  in  Roth  and  Murnighan  (1982)  was  observed  to 
be  bimodal,  with  modes  at  each  of  these  focal  points,  while  the  distribution  of  outcomes  was 
trimodal,  with  the  third  mode  being  bargaining  sessions  that  ended  in  disagreement. 
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As  mentioned  earlier,  a  broad  class  of  axiomatic  models’  make  common 
predictions  about  bargaining  games.  To  see  the  specific  predictions  make  for 
ternary  lottery  games,  we  will  consider  two  cases:  first,  the  case  in  which 
ai>  ci>  bi  for  both  bargainers  i =  1,  2,  which  will  be  called  the  case  of  high 
disagreement  payoffs,  and  second  the  case  in  which  ai > bi >  ci  for  i =  1,2, 
which  will  be  called  the  case  of  low  disagreement  payoffs. 
In  the  case  of  high  disagreement  payoffs,  the  disagreement  utilities  are 
given  by  ui(ci) =pi  where  pi  is  the  probability  that  makes  individual  i 
indifferent  between  the  payoff  ci  and  the  lottery  that  gives  him  ai  with 
probability  pi  and  bi  with  probability  1 -pi.  Since  under  this  normalization 
the  disagreement  utilities  are  the  only  feature  of  the  model  that  is  not 
symmetric  between  the  two  bargainers  (in  utility  space),  it  is  immediate  that 
axiomatic  models  such  as  Nash’s  solution,  for  example,  predict  that  the 
resulting  agreement  will  give  the  higher  probability  of  winning  the  preferred 
prize  a,  to  the  player  i  with  the  higher  disagreement  utility  ui(ci) =  pi.  That  is, 
these  models  predict  an  advantage  in  bargaining  in  this  situation  to  the 
player  who  is  more  risk  averse. 
In  the  case  of  low  disagreement  payoffs,  the  disagreement  utilities  are  given 
by  ui(ci) =p,/[p,-  11,  where  pi  is  the  probability  that  makes  individual  i 
indifferent  between  the  payoff  bi  and  the  lottery  that  gives  him  a,  with 
probability  pi  and  ci with  probability  1 -pi.  As  before,  models  such  as  Nash’s 
predict  the  resulting  agreement  will  give  the  higher  probability  of  winning 
the  preferred  prize  ai  to  the  player  i  with  the  higher  disagreement  utility 
ui(ci),  but  in  this  case  the  disagreement  utility  Ui(Ci) is  a  decreasing  function  of 
pi.  This  is,  these  models  predict  a  disadvantage  in  bargaining  in  this  situation 
to  the  player  who  is  more  risk  averse. 
3.  The study (reported  as  study  I  in  Cahier  8536) 
The  risk  aversion  of  each  participant  was  assessed  by  having  him  consider 
a  sequence  of  lottery  choices.  Players  were  asked  to  choose  between  receiving 
$5  for  certain,  or  participating  in  a  lottery  that  would  give  them  $10  with 
probability  p  and  $2  with  probability  1 -p,  with  p  decreasing  as  the  sequence 
of  choices  progressed.  They  were  instructed  that,  at  the  end  of  the  experi- 
ment,  one  element  of  the  sequence  would  be  chosen  at  random,  and  they 
would  receive  what  they  had  chosen,  i.e.,  $4  or  the  lottery.  Participants  were 
then  sorted  according  to  their  risk  aversion  (i.e.,  by  how  frequently  they 
chose  the  sure  $5):  individuals  in  the  more  risk  averse  half  of  the  experi- 
mental  population  bargained  with  individuals  in  the  less  risk  averse  half  of 
the  population. 
‘Including  all  those  that  are  symmetric  in  the  space  of  individually  rational  utility  payoffs  and 
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After  the  lottery  choices,  each  pair  of  bargainers  played  two  ternary  lottery 
games,  one  game  with  a, =  $10,  bi = $5,  and  ci = $2  for  both  bargainers  i = 1,2, 
and  the  other  game  with  ui=  $10,  bi=  $2,  and  ci=  $5  for  both  bargainers 
i=  1,2.  (Since  bargaining  was  conducted  anonymously  via  computer  termi- 
nals,  and  since  this  pair  of  games  between  the  same  bargainers  was  irter- 
spersed  with  games  against  other  opponents,  bargainers  were  unaware  that 
they  bargained  twice  with  the  same  individual.)  The  prediction  of  the  classical 
game  theoretic  model  is  that  the  more  risk  averse  of  the  two  bargainers 
will  receive  less  than  50”/,  of  the  lottery  tickets  in  the  low  disagreement 
payoff  game,  and  more  than  50%  in  the  high  disagreement  payoff  game. 
Note  that  this  prediction,  which  implies  that  the  bargainer  who  does  better 
in  one  game  should  do  worse  in  the  other,  contradicts  the  prediction  of  the 
other  two  hypotheses  about  bargaining  ability  as  a  personal  attribute.  If 
bargaining  ability  is  related  to  some  personal  attribute  that  influences  the 
outcome  of  bargaining  independently  of  the  position  of  the  disagreement 
payoff,  then  the  relative  outcomes  of  the  two  players  in  the  two  games 
should  be  the  same;  i.e.,  the  ‘better  bargainer’  should  do  better  in  both 
games.  If  bargaining  ability  is  related  to  some  personal  attribute  of  the 
bargainers  that  is  uncorrelated  with  their  risk  aversion,  then  which  bargainer 
does  better  should  be  independent  of  the  sorting  by  risk  aversion.  If 
bargaining  ability  is  correlated  with  risk  aversion,  but  unaffected  by  the 
position  of  the  disagreement  payoff,  the  more  or  less  risk  averse  bargainers 
should  obtain  consistently  better  outcomes. 
4.  Conduct  of  bargaining 
Approximately  30  volunteers  were  recruited.  In  the  first  part  of  the 
experiment  the  participants  made  their  21  choices  between  $5  or  a  lottery 
between  $2  and  $10.  In  the  second  part  of  the  experiment  the  eight  most  risk 
averse  subjects  (according  to  their  lottery  choices)  were  paired  with  the  eight 
least  risk  averse  subjects.  Each  subject  had  four  bargaining  sessions  lasting 
nine  minutes  each.  A  more  detailed  description  of  a  similar  bargaining 
session  can  be  found  in  Roth  and  Murnighan  (1982). 
5.  Results 
The  first  question  before  analyzing  the  actual  bargaining  outcomes  was 
whether  the  assignment  of  players  as  more  or  less  risk  averse  successfully 
differentiated  between  them.  In  other  words.  were  the  less  risk  averse  players 
actually  significantly  less  risk  averse  on  their  initial  selections  from  the  21 
lottery  choices?  An  analysis  of  variance  using  the  number  of  lottery  choices 
as  the  dependent  variable  and  the  assignment  to  positions  of  less  or  more 
risk  averse  as  independent  variables  yielded  clear  results:  players  identified  as 270  J.K.  Murnighan,  AX.  Roth  and  F.  Schoumaker,  Risk aversion  and  bargaining 
less  risk  averse  chose  significantly  more  lottery  choices  R =  11.2)  than  players 
identified  as  more  risk  averse  (Z  = 4.2):  F( 1.62) =  112.3,  p < 0.0001. 
There  were  68  games  played,  27  disagreements,  all  of  them  in  the  games 
with  a  disagreement  prize  of  $5.  Among  the  agreements  there  were  25  equal 
5G-50  divisions,  15  divisions  where  one  player  received  43  to  49  (and  the 
other  obviously  from  57  to  51),  one  40-60  division  and  one  35-65  division. 
Pairs  of  bargainers  reached  two  agreements  only  five  times.  An  additional 
subset  of  these  data  also  provides  some  information  to  test  the  prediction.  In 
situations  where  a  disagreement  occurred,  say  in  the  high  disagreement  game 
(the  most  frequent  case),  support  for  the  predictions  could  also  be  counted  if 
the  less  risk  averse  player’s  final  demand  when  they  disagreed  was  less  than 
his  agreed  upon  outcome  in  the  low  disagreement  game.  In  such  situations,  if 
bargaining  had  continued  until  an  agreement  was  reached,  the  less  risk 
averse  player  would  necessarily  have  obtained  a  lower  outcome  than  he 
received  in  the  low  disagreement  game  unless  bad  faith  bargaining  (increas- 
ing  your  demands  rather  than  making  concessions)  occurred.8  When  these 
clear  cut  final  demands  are  taken  into  consideration  there  are  seven  pairs 
where  the  more  risk  averse  player  does  better  in  the  low  disagreement 
condition  than  in  the  high  disagreement  condition  and  two  pairs  where  he 
does  better  in  the  high  disagreement  condition.  This  is  in  the  direction 
predicted  by  the  theory  but  it  is  not  statistically  significant. 
In  this  study  there  was  a  preponderance  of  5&50  agreements.  This  is 
consistent  with  data  collected  from  numerous  previous  experiments  which 
indicate  that  agreements  tend  to  cluster  around  ‘focal  points’.  There  were 
also  many  disagreements  in  the  high  disagreement  prize  condition. 
The  typical  pair  of  outcomes  was  a  50-50  agreement  in  the  low  disagree- 
ment  condition  and  a  disagreement  in  the  high  disagreement  condition.  This 
makes  it  difficult  to  discern  the  effects  of  risk  aversion.  To  the  extent  that  we 
could  observe  this  effect,  our  data  supported  the  theoretical  predictions. 
More  data  was  needed  to  permit  statistically  reliable  conclusions.  Since 
only  a  small  fraction  of  the  data  using  this  design  permitted  the  hypothesis 
to  be  tested  we  decided  to  collect  the  additional  data  using  a  modified  design 
that  would  decrease  the  number  of  disagreements  and  increase  the  variance 
of  the  agreements.  Our  previous  experiments  suggested  changes  in  the  prizes 
that  would  achieve  these  objectives  and  therefore  allow  us  to  more  easily 
ascertain  the  effect  of  risk  aversion.  The  two  additional  studies  are  explained 
in  Murnighan,  Roth  and  Schoumaker  (1986)  from  which  this  summary  is 
drawn.  The  additional  data  obtained  from  these  studies  allowed  us  to 
observe  statistically  significant  effects  of  risk  aversion  in  the  predicted 
direction.  The  reader  is  referred  to  the  full  report  for  a  discussion  of  these 
results  and  their  significance. 
‘We  never  observed  any  agreements  where  bargaining  in  bad  faith  increased  a  player’s 
potential  outcomes.  Instead,  this  was  not  frequent,  and  was  usually  a  cue  for  disagreements. J.K.  Murnighan,  A.E.  Roth  and  F.  Schoumaker,  Risk aversion  and  bargaining  271 
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